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Abstract--This paper describes the use of a system model in the support of a fishery management process. 
The system provides an integrated framework for describing the dynamic interactions among fish 
resources, fishermen, processors, and consumers through the notion of market equilibrium. In addition 
to giving a complete detail on the system components and the integration mechanism, the paper also 
describes how the integrated system can be used in supporting fishery management processing required 
by the Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976. 
1. INTRODUCTION 
Next to agriculture, fisheries represent one of the most vital renewable resources available to 
mankind. In the U.S.A. alone the 1979 commercial landings were 6.3 billion pounds with a 
dockside value over $2.2 billion. Using an estimated multiplier of 3.5, the contribution of fish to 
the economy was over $7.7 billion. Despite the importance of fisheries, rational management 
measures have eluded policy makers responsible for fisheries. In historical times resource usage 
was on a small scale and management was conducted by a chief or council. With the spread of 
property rights, lakes and other small inland sources of fish were parceled out to property owners. 
However, the scale of ocean resources was a hindrance to the use of property rights as a 
management measure. 
The genesis of the fishery problem is that it is a shared resource. There is no ownership of the 
stock. Acting individually each fisherman has no incentive to leave behind sufficient fish in the 
ocean to replenish the stock for subsequent fishing seasons. From a practical point of view, it is 
very difficult and possibly even undesirable to assign property rights to ocean fisheries. 
The modern era of fishery management starts in the 60s. At that time, there was considerable 
international pressure in the United Nations to draw up a comprehensive fishery agreement. 
Domestically the pressure resulted in the passage of the Fishery Conservation and Management 
Act of 1976 [1]. The Act explicitly established 320 km (200 miles) extended fishery manage- 
ment jurisdictions. It was billed as Public Law 94-265 and will subsequently be referred to as 
FCMA. 
Under the act the Congress et up eight Regional Councils. These Councils were composed of 
fishermen, processing industry, scientists and government representatives, and were collectively 
charged with managing the fish in the best interest of the Nation. 
Attempts at rational fishery management are as old as antiquity. However, three recent 
approaches stand out quite distinctly from the rest. These are the surplus yield approach, the 
maximum economic yield approach and the optimal control approach. 
The surplus yield approach was formally developed by Schafer [2]. According to this theory, the 
environment has a limited ability to renew this resource. This ability is dependent on the stock 
density and the carrying capacity of the environment. Humans may harvest the surplus, which is 
a function of stock size. Schafer postulated that the surplus yield was a concave function of stock 
and a quadratic function of the effort. Figure 1 shows Schafer's postulation of sustainable yield 
as a function of stock, the point Ym~y represents maximum sustainable yield. While the surplus yield 
models have a sound biological basis, the economic implication of fishery management is not 
included in such considerations. Moreover, MSY is a static equilibrium concept which is hard to 
measure in the realistic dynamic environment. 
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Fig. 1. Maximum sustainable yield and maximum economic yield as a function of stock. 
The economists approached the management issue from the notion of maximum economic 
yield [3-5]. For the economists, they saw the basic problem being unlimited entry into the fishery. 
Using perfectly competitive fixed price models, they showed that if unlimited entry was permitted, 
all the rent would be dissipated. Their basic policy prescription was limited entry. They argued 
that this would increase rent to the original fishermen without resulting in overcapacity in the 
industry. Thus their prescription was to operate the fishery at maximum economic yield (MEY) 
to the harvesters, which amounts to moving the economically optimal point as shown in Fig. 1. 
See Dasgupta nd Heal [6] for a detailed discussion. Like MSY, MEY is a static equilibrium 
concept. Even though these two concepts are still discussed and regarded highly in any fishery 
management policy assessment, they do not provide guidelines for development of management 
policy decisions. 
The 1970s aw the advent of optimal control as a policy tool for fishery management. Proponents 
of this tool, most notably Clark [7], Spence [8] and Lewis [9], approached the fishery from the view 
of the central planner. The objective function was set as the sum (or integral) of an aggregate 
discounted net benefits tream measured in monetary value. The control variable was fishing effort. 
The basic shortcoming of this approach was that it aggregated user groups into a single entity 
represented by the somewhat vague concept of the central planner. As used by the advocates of 
optimal control, the concept of the central planner suppresses natural conflicting interests of 
participants in the fishery while highlighting only one common goal, aggregate surplus maximiza- 
tion. For obvious reasons, optimal control models have found little application in practical 
problems handled by Councils. In recent years, some attempts at the problem via dynamic game 
theory have been made. Unfortunately, they do not address the actual policy process in fishery 
management decisions. 
2. THE ROLE OF MODELING IN THE FISHERY MANAGEMENT 
DECISION PROCESS 
It is explicitly indicated in the Act that the fishery resource is to be managed for the benefit of 
the people. However, the problem is complicated by the fact that different groups of people have 
different concepts of benefit hey can derive from utilizing the fishery resources. Because of the 
diverse beneficiary groups with different preferences, there cannot be a single scalar measure which 
represents the "social and economic well-being" of the nation. Therefore, "optimum" fishery 
management policy is not determined by maximizing any utility measure, but rather, is developed 
through a decision process. According to the Act, such a process must be supported by the best 
available scientific information. 
To describe the decision making process, we first distinguish three groups: the decision making 
(DM) group, who has the power to make a fishery management decision; the experts (EX), who, 
collectively have all the information related, or unrelated, to the fishery problem at hand; and the 
stakeholders (SH), or the beneficiary groups, who stand to gain or lose as a consequence of a certain 
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fishery management decision. These three groups may or may not be disjoint; e.g. it is possible that 
a member in DM is also a member in EX and/or a member in SH; a member in EX is also a member 
in SH, etc. 
The decision process tarts with SH expressing "concerns" to DM, e.g. ecologists express concern 
about turtle extinction, groundfish fishermen express concern about bycatch of groundfish by 
shrimp fishermen, shrimp fishermen express concern about industry prospects when fuel price goes 
up, etc. Such concerns are encoded into attributes such as vessel's net profit, consumer's surplus, 
shrimp stock, etc., which are used to determine the desirability of a certain outcome, through 
interacting and extracting relevant information from EX. The DM is then to generate a set of 
potential fishery management plans. By combining the best scientific information, each plan is 
evaluated by determining: (1) the set of plausible outcomes, (2) the confidence in such outcomes, 
and (3) the attributes' measure associated with the plausible outcomes. All these are communicated 
to SH through interaction between DM and SH. Through this process either a final plan is chosen 
or new concerns are expressed which lead to the generation of a new plausible plan. The above 
process which describes the interaction among the three groups in arriving at a final decision, is 
called a responsive decision process: a process through which a decision is arrived at by using the 
best available information in response to the concerns of the SH. 
One of the important steps in the responsive decision process is the evaluation of any potential 
plan. The group of experts (EX) consists of scientists who possess knowledge in different 
disciplines related to the fishery problem under consideration (e.g. biologists possess knowledge 
of fish population, economists of fishery markets, sociologists of fishery communities, etc.); and 
professionals who have extensive xperience related to the fishery (e.g. fishermen in fishing 
operation, ship builders in vessel construction, processors in fish processing, etc.). Each of these 
experts is very knowledgeable in his or her domain. Each of them can deduce the possible 
consequences of a particular choice in the component that he or she is familiar with, while assuming 
that the rest of the related components remain unchanged. Such fragmented knowledge must be 
integrated toprovide a coherent picture of the plausible outcomes as a consequence of a plan being 
adopted. This is where an integrated model can play an important role. 
It should be emphasized that such a model does not play the role of a forecasting tool, but rather, 
it is a "what if" box that can help the decision maker to understand how the combined information 
provided by the experts can be used to assess a potential plan. To fulfill such a role, the model 
must have the following characteristics: (1) it must capture expert knowledge in each specific 
domain; (2) it must provide the appropriate linkages which tie the experts knowledge together; (3) 
it must be simple enough to allow extensive sensitivity studies o as to explore the set of plausible 
outcomes under different scenarios; and (4) it must be flexible enough so that as knowledge 
accumulates, it can be appropriately incorporated. 
A research effort was started at Stanford in 1976 in developing a model that would fulfill the 
integration objective as described above. The research resulted in an integrated Fisheries System 
Management Model (FISYS) which was later refined and implemented in the Southeast Fisheries 
center. Studies were done using FISYS to analyze fishery policy related to the Tortugas hrimp 
fishery [10], the Texas shrimp fishery [11], and the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery [12]. In this paper, 
we shall describe FISYS and its use in the management support process, and in the companion 
paper [13], we shall describe a case study of the Gulf of Mexico shrimp fishery. 
3. MODULES OF FISYS 
To develop a mathematical model for fishery management, we need first to identify the 
beneficiary groups of the fishery. Briefly, they are fishermen, processors and consumers. Actually 
there are some other groups too. These are handlers, wholesalers, retailers, and so on. However, 
their interests are closely aligned with one or another of the major groupings, hence the minor 
groups are not treated explicitly. The interactions of these groups are shown in Fig. 2. 
Flowing from the ocean to the consumer is the fish, while flowing from consumers are resources 
which are expended to keep the fish coming. For each group, the next step is to develop 
mathematical models describing their technological production capabilities and their decision-mak- 
ing framework. Finally, these individual models are integrated into a single model. The equilibrium 
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Fig. 2. Principal components of a fishery. 
is characterized as a set of vectors that “solve” the integrated model. The model investigated is 
a stylized generic model of a fishery. It represents the important elements and their mutual 
interactions. The attempt is not necessarily to be accurate in the minutest details but to capture 
the essence of the reality modeled. In this section we describe the modules of FISYS representing 
the principal components of a fishery, and in Section 4, we describe the integrating framework of 
FISYS. 
3.1. Fish population dynamics 
A generic cohort population model is used to represent he number of fish in each age group 
through time. Let T be the life span of the fish species under consideration, and subdivide T 
into I equal intervals of duration T/l each. The number of fish in each interval i is Ni. After the 
duration of a time period, the number of fish that survive are advanced to the next cohort. Thus, 
looking at the transition of fish in ground j from t to t + 1 and cohort i to i + 1, we have 
(t = 0, T/i, 2TI1, . . .) 
Nlj(t)=Rj(t); 
Ni+l,j = NV(t) - Fu(t) - MO(t) + Ii+ I./(t) - o,(t); 
N,(O) = N;; (3.1) 
where NV = number of fish of cohort i in ground j, FO = number of fish in cohort i, ground j 
lost due to fishing mortality, MU = number of fish in cohort i, ground j lost due to natural 
mortality, Rj = number of recruits in ground j, Z,, ,j = number of fish of cohort i + 1 migrating 
into ground j, 0, = number of fish of cohort i migrating out of ground j, NO, = initial stock in 
cohort i, ground j. MU is given by [ 141 
M,(t) = N,(t)e-“u * f , (3.2) 
where dg is the discrete natural mortality rate for cohort i in ground j. R, is critically dependent 
on the survival of larvae and the original numbers of eggs laid. Beverton and Holt [15] gave the 
following function: 
1 
R, = - 
4 
(3.3) 
“‘+A, 
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where ~j and Bj are dependent on environmental factors like temperature, wind, abundance of 
predators, etc. For many specie, Aj, which represents eggs laid, is very large regardless of the 
number of mature cohorts; and in such cases, Rj can be treated as an exogenous variable. This is 
actually the case for the shrimp fishery reported in the companion paper [13]. 
The migration models for/~+ ~,j and O U are dependent on the specific fishery under consideration. 
The general form of the migration model is 
Ii+ ~q(t)= 4,+ w(N~k(t); k ~j);  O~(t)= ~o(No(t)). (3.4) 
Finally, the fishing mortality is linked to the harvesting model. 
3.2. Harvesting model 
The harvesting model is developed from two considerations: the production function of fishing 
vessels and the fishermen's harvesting decision. The vessels' production efficiency is represented by 
the catchability coefficient q such that 
Ay = qN AE, (3.5) 
where Ay is the incremental landing resulting from incremental effort AE (measured in fraction of 
days fished) and the stock is N. From the definition (3.5), it implicitly implies that the parametery 
q depends not only on the fishing technology, it also depends on the specific fishing ground the 
vessel is operating in as well as the fish species to be harvested. In ground j where there is a mix 
of cohort classes, then 
Ay~ = qoNu AEj. (3.6) 
Consider the time period 
ImT (m + 1)T] 
t~  - I  ' 1 " 
We assume that migration and recruitment only occur at the end of the interval. Within the time 
interval, fish stock in ground j will be depleted because of natural and fishing mortality. Let us 
subdivide the interval into 
[m__~ mt 1 Q.~- +nAt , -T+(n+l )At  
with n = 0, 1 . . . . .  I - 1 such that IAt = T/l. For each interval of At, the maximum effort that can 
be exerted by each vessel type k is AE (k). If vessel k allocates AE) k) to ground j, within the period 
Q., then the incremental catch by vessel k from ground j within the period Q. is 
Ayl~ ) q~k)N~(~ + n At)_,..(k ) T = ar~)  ; i = 1 . . . . .  7"  (3 .7 )  
The constraint on AE) k) is 
AE) k) <~ AE(k)(n); AE) k) >>. O, (3.8) 
where AE(k)(n)~ [0, AE(k)]. AE(k)(n) = 0 represents he situation where fishing is not allowed within 
the period Q, due to closure policy; and AE(k)(n) <~ AE (k) may represent the situation that weather 
conditions within period Q, disallow maximum fishing effort. 
Given AE(k)(n), the vessels may not expend any fishing effort if incremental effort does not pay 
off. This can be modeled as follows. Fish is sold at the dockside where the selling unit is usually 
in terms of weight instead of number of fish; and several cohort classes are sold at the same 
price/weight. We can group the cohort classes into q categories price/weight. Assume that a 
vector dockside price for G is Pd ("d" for dockside), where all cohorts in G~ have a dockside price 
Pdu, U = 1 . . . . .  q. The cohort class have the average weight vector w = {w~ . . . . .  wt}. Then the 
incremental economic return of expending {AE) k)} within Q, is 
(k) ( mT )AE,  k). (3.9) rick'= Z Z Pd. Z wiqu NU ---ff + n At 
j u i~G u 
CAMWA 17-8/9--L 
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The incremental cost is 
Z c5 AE5 
J 
where CJ/') is the cost per unit effort for vessel type k to fish in ground j. Since (3.9) is linear in 
AEJk I, 1"I ok) is maximized by allocating AE~k)(n) to the ground j* such that 
~Pdu ~w~qu2No*( mT )C}  k) ~Piu~ )N~( mT ) T + At - >>. wiq~ k ~ + n At _ ~Jr'~k), (3.10) 
u i~G u " u 
and additional fishing for vessel type k does not pay off if 
~k" \ /mT ) E Pd, E wiq'y2No'{--[-- + b At < C~$ ). (3.11) 
u i~G u 
Combining the economic, the environmental nd fishing policy factors, we have the harvesting 
decision model 
fae,',(.) ifj=j* and (3.11)is false (3.12) A~k)(n) = 
(o i f j  # j *  or (3.11) is true. 
Total number of cohort i in ground j that will be harvested by the fishing vessels in Q~ is 
Fij(n)=~q~)Nij(~-+nAt)A~k)(n). (3.13) 
The fish stock at (mT/l)+ (n + 1)At is 
(mT ) ( m T )  
N,j -7 -+(n  + 1)At = N U --7-+n At - Fo(n)-doAr (3.14) 
The above analysis can be repeated for n = 1, 2 . . . . .  I - 1. 
For a given dockside price vector Pd, which is assumed to be constant in 
[mT,(ml l )T  ] 
and the cohort stock Nu(mT/l), the above process allows us to determine the total dockside landing, 
in terms of category G, given by 
/--1 
j n=O 
Also, the above effort allocation process analysis 
group. We shall denote them as 
Xd = Xd(Pd, N); 
H = 1-I(P~, N); 
where Pd is the dockside price vector within the 
the beginning of the time period. 
Ft,(n). (3.15) 
i~G u 
allows us to determine the profit for each vessel 
xd = {xdu}, 
H = {IItk)}, (3.16) 
time period and N is the cohort matrix (Nu) at 
3.3. Processor model 
The processor is the proverbial middleman in the fishery. He obtains fish through dockside 
purchase. The fish are then transformed into a number of products. Each of these processed 
products requires appropriate input from mechanized plants and labor. Fish processing plants are 
operationally simple. Typically, plant capital consists of washing, cleaning, and packing equipment, 
freezing capacity to store, and ovens to cook the fish. Most plants are laid out in the assembly line 
format with conveyor belts transferring the fish from one point to another. 
Most processors maintain an inventory of processed and unprocessed fish. This inventory 
serves to smooth out the supply of fish and the demand for retail products. By investing in 
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freezing capacity, processors eliminate much of the inherent uncertainties associated with 
supply and demand. Since freezing capacity is relatively cheap and fish keep up to 6 months in 
cold storage, inventories provide an easy means to ensure a raw material and finished goods supply. 
Yet most processors keep inventories down to a minimum to economize on storage and working 
capital costs. 
In the context of the present model, with its seasonal horizon, held raw inventories must be 
added to supply and held processed inventories ubtracted from demand. Similarly, expected raw 
inventory held at the end of the season must be subtracted from supply and processed inventory 
added to demand. However, if the magnitudes involved are not large and policies are not expected 
to dramatically influence supply or demand, then inventories need not be treated explicitly. Such 
is assumed in this paper, however, extension to the more general case is straightforward. 
Studies of processing firms reveal at least two firm types. Some firms exercise considerable 
influence on the fishery; we call these the "large" firms. Other firms more or less follow the pattern 
set by the large firms. We call these the "small" firms. The structure of the processing firms exhibit 
a leader/follower o Stackelberg type of interaction, with small firms following the pricing decision 
of large firms. Given prices set by large processors, mall processors produce as much as their 
capacities permit. The large firms set dockside price and retail quantity in order to maximize their 
profit. Such behavior was reported by Alvarez et al. [16] and O'Rourke [17]. 
The decision models for the small and large processor are quite different. The small processors 
take dockside price Pd and retail price P~ as given and they choose xds, x,~ to maximize profit: 
max{(P~- Cps)Tx~-- PdXXds} such that G~sx~ Xds; Xrs~['~ps , (3.17) 
where Gx~ presents the material balance constraints between dockside fish catagories and the fish 
products, and lips represents other constraints like capacity, productivity, etc. 
The large processors on the other hand can influence the dockside price. Suppose that 
the available fish quantity at the dockside is Xdt, the large processors will solve the following 
problem: 
max(Pr(xrt+ xrs)- Cpl)TXrl such that Gixa~<Xdt; Xaellpt, (3.18) 
Xr/ 
where Pr(') is the inverse retail demand function (see Section 3.4), Xrs is the total retail supply by 
the small processors which is assumed to be known by the large processors, and C~ is the unit 
processing cost for large processors. The shadow price for xdt, which is represented by the Lagrange 
multiplier associated with the material balance constraint of (3.18), would be the dockside price 
that the large processors will be willing to pay. Denote the shadow price by /~d(Xdt, X~). 
3.4. Retail demand 
The retail demand model is represented by 
with inverse demand function 
Xr = Or(Pr), (3.19) 
P, = Pr(x,). (3.20) 
The demand (or the inverse demand) function can be estimated from numerous observations 
on market data. In the fishery studies, usually the dockside demand is estimated (see e.g. 
Bockstael [18]). Presently data on retail demand are not routinely gathered by the Fisheries Service 
and hence, no estimation of retail demand is available. It was observed that because the supply 
in many fisheries is seasonal, the processors' buying behavior varies over the season in order to 
satisfy a more stable (non-seasonal) retail demand. Therefore, seasonal demand estimates should 
be made rather than annual ones; a mistake which is commonly made for seasonal fisheries. 
In this paper, we describe an algorithm for computing the partial equilibrium, assuming that the 
retail demand function is available. If only dockside demand is available, the modification is 
straightforward. 
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4. INTEGRATING FRAMEWORK VIA PART IAL  EQUIL IBR IUM 
In the previous section, we have developed escriptive models of the tactical decision-making 
processes of fishermen, processors and consumers. For each group it has been shown how they 
determine their actions in response to prevailing conditions. The development in the previous 
section has treated each group in isolation. In this section, we shall link the individual models into 
a single integrated framework. This framework will describe how the actions of one group affect 
and are affected by the actions of the other groups. Given a set of environmental conditions (e.g. 
fish stocks, capacity, and so on), these actions will result in outcomes reflecting the characteristic 
of the fishery. Thus, for the season under consideration, the combination of participants' decision 
models and environmental conditions will determine "what happens" in the fishery. 
From the modeling point of view, these outcomes are characterized by the partial equilibrium 
concept. From a practical point of view, the equilibrium achieved in the fishery will tell us how 
much fish was caught, which vessels caught it, how much effort was spent, what dockside price 
was paid, how much profit each vessel group was making, what the fish was processed into, what 
price the consumers paid, how much profit each processor group was making, and so on. From 
a mathematical point of view, the equilibrium is the fixed point of the composite dockside and retail 
supply and demand interaction. Finally, from a computational point of view, we are computing 
the fixed point of the composite supply-inverse demand mapping. 
In an abstract setting, assume that we are given supply and inverse demand mappings as follows: 
q = q(p); 
h = h(q); (4.1) 
where O is the price vector the producers are facing, q(-) is the supply function, h is the price vector 
the purchasers are willing to pay and h(.) is the inverse demand function. The composite 
supply-inverse demand mapping is given by 
= h(q(o)) ,  (4.2) 
which is a mapping from a price vector p to another price vector ~. The partial equilibrium is 
represented by the fixed point p* such that 
p* = h(q(p*)). (4.3) 
4.1. Composite supply-inverse demand mapping 
To proceed with the integrating framework, let us first develop the supply-inverse demand 
mapping for the whole fishery system based on the modules developed in Section 3. 
Let p -  (Pd, Pr) be a price vector the producers are facing. The harvesting process model 
developed in Section 3.2 gives us the total landing the fishing groups will provide: 
X d -~- xd(Pd), (4.4) 
where the dependence on N is suppressed in this discussion. 
With (Pd, Pr) given, the small processor will purchase ~ds from dockside and sell ~ at retail which 
is a solution of the optimization problem (3.17). Now the large processors play a Stackelberg 
strategy and solve another optimization problem (3.18) with x~ replaced by ~ and Xdt replaced 
by Xd -- ~¢ds" Denote the solution of (3.18) by ~a and the shadow price for x d - ~ds by Pd" The vector 
(Pa, Its) where 
~s -~ Pr(~rs + J~,t) (4.5) 
is the image under the composite supply-inverse demand mapping. Note that the composite 
mapping is expressed in terms of a sequence of optimization calculations. If only dockside demand 
is available, then p ~-Pd and II = hd(Xd) where hd(') is the inverse dockside-demand mapping. 
4.2. Computation of partial equilibrium 
We had described how the independent modules developed in Section 3 can be integrated to 
provide a composite supply-inverse demand mapping. We can now discuss the computation of 
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partial equilibrium via the computation of fixed point for such a mapping. In fact, we can develop 
a more general algorithmic procedure for the general composite mapping represented by (4.2). The 
specification of such an algorithm to the specific fishery system is immediate in light of discussions 
in Section 4.1. 
Let us denote the generic composite mapping by 
It = #(p) = h(q(p)). (4.6) 
We have the following algorithm for computing the fixed point of (4.6). 
The updated successive approximation (USA) algorithm 
Step 0 
Choose an aribtrary tolerance 6. 
Arbitrarily define positive vector p(0). 
Set k = 0. Go through Step 1-3 omitting any operation involving the k - 1 iteration. 
Set k = 1. Define positive vector p(1). 
Step 1 
Solve the composite supply~lemand mapping through a sequence of optimization 
algorithms to obtain 
,(k) - ~[p(k)] 
Step 2 
Define the error and change in error vectors 
E(k ) ~- p(k ) -/~ (k); 
Test for convergence. 
If II  (k)II 6, go to Step 4. 
Otherwise, compute the updating factor 
,Z~k~ - [p(k) - p(k - 1)] 7 aE(k) 
' ' -  II,(k)ll IIA (k)ll 
The choice of 7 will be discussed later. 
Step 3 
Compute the new approximation vector 
AE(k) - E(k) - e(k - 1) 
(4.7) 
p(k + l) --- [1 - 2(k)lp(k) + 2(k)/~(k) 
(4.8) 
0 < ), < 1 (4.9) 
Let k = k + 1 
Go to Step 1 
Step 4 
Exit. The algorithm has converged to the equilibrium vector p*. 
(4.10) 
Convergence of USA 
It should be noted that, however, the algorithm is not guaranteed to converge (or exit) for an 
arbitrary choice of parameters (p(0),p(1), V). In the following, we shall discuss the convergence 
properties of USA. To do this, we need to first define the notion of antitonal mapping. 
Definition 4.1 
The mapping/z(p) is said to be antitonal if 
[/-t(P0 -- #(P2)]T[P, -P2] ~< 0 Vp,,p2 >10. (4.11) 
Antitonality isa natural generalization ton dimensions of the familiar downward slopping function 
defined on a real line. 
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We assume that #(p) is an antitonal mapping, which is a rather mild assumption for composite 
supply-inverse demand mapping. Let us define, referring to the USA algorithm, the error vector 
e(k ) ~- (p(k ) - p*), (4.12) 
where p* is the fixed point of the composite mapping (4.6). Let us define 
p(k, 2 )~p(k) -2`E(k ) ;  2~[0, 1], (4.13) 
e(k, 4) =p(k,  2`) - p*. (4.14) 
Lemma 4.1 
II e(k, 2`)tl 2 is convex in 2  `with its minimum at 2* where 4" is given by 
2`, = C(k  )e(k ) 
i i ,(k) l[ 2 . (4.15) 
Moreover, II e(k, 2`)II < II e(k)II for all 2 e(0, 22`*). 
Proof. From (4.13) and (4.14), we have 
II e(k, 2`)II 2 = (p(k) - p* - 2`E(k))T(p(1) -- p* -- 2`, (k)) 
= II e(k)II 2 - 22`C(k)(p(k) -p* )  + 42 II e(k)II 2, (4.16) 
which is quadratic in 2 .` Consider the term cr (k ) (p (h) -  p*), we have 
EX(k )(p(h ) - p*) = (p(k ) - /z(k))T(p(h)  - p*) 
= (p(k)  - p* + p* - iz(k))T(p(k) - p*) 
= (p(k)  - p*)T(p(k) -- p*) -- (#(k) - p*)r(p(k) - p*). (4.17) 
Since p* is fixed point of (4.6),/~(p*) = p*, and thus by the antitonal assumption, 
(/~(k) - p*)T(p(k) -- p*) = (/~(k) - la(p*))T(p(k) -- p*) < 0. (4.18) 
Combining (4.17) and (4.18) gives 
ET(k ) (p (k ) -p* )>O if p (k )#p*  and #(k)#p* .  (4.19) 
This implies that (4.16) is convex in 2 with the minimum achieved at 
2`. = C(k) (p (k ) -  p*) cr(k)e(k) p*. (4.20) 
i i~(k)l l  2 = i[~(k)ll 2 >0 if p(k)# 
Because of the quadratic nature of  (4.16), lie(k, 2`)II < lie(k)II as long as 2` < 2`0 where 
_22oE~(k)e(k )  + (2`o)~ II'(k)II ~ = 0 ~ 2`0 = 
Lemma 4.2 
2ET(k)e(k) 
II,(k)ll 2 
The USA algorithm will generate a positive sequence {2`(k)} such that 
2(k)l l ,(k)l l  ~k  t lp (1 ) -p (0) l l ,  k =0,  1 . . . .  
I1~(1)11 ' 
Proof. Equations (4.9) and (4.10) give 
= 22,*. (4.21) 
- (p (k ) -p (k  - 1))TAE(k)T 
I[E(k)ll II AE(k)][ 
(4.22) 
p(k + l ) -p (k )= -2 (k )¢ (k )= e(k). (4.23) 
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This implies 
]lp(k 4- 1 ) -p (k ) I I  ~< ~ lip(k) -p (k  - 1)II, 
and applying (4.23) and (4.24) iteratively, we have 
12(k)l liE(k)l[ ~< ~12(k - 1)111E(k - 1)11 ~< ~k Ilp(1)-p(0) l[ 
IlE(1)ll 
From (4.9), 
(4.24) 
(4.25) 
(p(k) -p (k  - 1))T(p(k) -- g(k) -p (k  - 1) 4- p(k - 1)) 
~(k)= II,(k)ll IIA,(k)ll 
= l ip(k)-p(k - l)II 2 -  (p (k ) -p (k  - 1))'r(/a(k)- #(k - 1)) 
II,(k)ll Ila,(k)ll 
kip(k) -p (k  - l)II 2 >~ 0, (4.26) 
where the first inequality comes from the antitonicity assumption. The lemma now follows 
from (4.25). 
Combining Lemmas 4.1 and 4.2, we have 
Theorem 4.1 
The USA will generate a sequence {e(k)} such that for any fixed k < oo, either 
_ .  2C(k )e(k ) 
or  
A(k)l]c(k)l[ ~> - -  
Combining (4.22) and (4.30), we have 
(4.27) 
I[e(k 4- 1)ll < Ile(k)ll . (4.28) 
Proof. Consider the sequence {2(k)} generated by USA. If (4.27) is not true, then we have 
2C(k )e(k ) 
2(k) < II~(k)II 2 = 22., (4.29) 
and from Lemma 4.1, II e(k 4- 1)II ~< tie(k) II (equality only if 2 (k )= 0). From (4.26), we see that 
2(k) >0 i fk  <oo.  
From (4.17), we have cr(k)e(k)>1 1 e(k)II 2, and therefore if (4.27)is true, we conclude that 
2 II eKk)II 2 (4.30) 
II~(k)ll 
~k I[P(I)-P(0)[[ 2tle(k)l[ 2 (4.31) 
[Ic(l)ll ~ ][e(k)[--------~" 
However, if (4.27)is true, then from Lemma 4.1, Ile(k + l)II > lie(k) II. Thus (4.27) can only be 
true for a finite number of iterations, or else (4.31) will be contradicted. We have immediately the 
following result. 
Theorem 4.2 
The USA will generate a sequence {e(k)} with norms which are monotonic nonincreasing for 
all k = 1,2 . . . .  except for a finite number of them. 
Theorem 4.2 implies that e(k)~e* as k~oo.  The issue is whether e*= 0, which implies that 
p (k )~p*  as k--*oo. Note that i fp (k )~p* ,  then/~(k)~p* and thus c(k)~0. Therefore if e* = 0 
then the USA algorithm will converge (exit). 
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To see why the algorithm may not converge, consider (4.24) where we have 
and as k ~ oo, 
Thus we see if 
k k 
[]p(k + l)-p(0)ll < E [Ip(i + 1)-p(i)1] < ~ y'llp(])-p(0) I[, 
i=O i=0  
(4.32) 
[[p(oo) -p(0)II ~< lip(l) --p(0)[] (4.33) 
1--y 
lip* -p(0)II > lip(0 -p(0)II (4.34) 
1-- 7 
then p(oo) cannot be equal to p* and e* # 0. Therefore to ensure convergence of USA we need 
to either pick p(1) "far" away from p(0) or 7 close to 1. However, (4.22) indicates that if y is very 
close to 1, then convergence speed will be slow. 
An adaptive procedure in selecting y is possible: choose 2: close to 1 (like 0.98) in the beginning, 
then switch to a smaller value when the convergence speed slows down. However, computational 
experiences indicated that this is not necessary: in all the cases that we had run, as long as y 
was chosen reasonably close to 1 (say 0.8) and p(1) and p(0) were chosen reasonably far apart 
(e.g. take p(0) lower than the equilibrium prices and p(1) above the equilibrium prices which 
can be estimated conservatively), the algorithm always converges. For more discussions on the 
convergence experiences of USA, see [19-23]. 
5. THE USE OF FISYS IN A F ISHERY MANAGEMENT DECISION PROCESS 
The basic role that FISYS can play in a fishery management decision process is the integration 
of information from many sources and disciplines to provide an overall picture of the situation 
under policy choices. However, credibility of FISYS must be gained through a validation process 
before it can play such a role effectively. We shall first describe the validation process before 
discussing the use of FISYS in a fishery management decision process. 
The validity of FISYS must be tested on several grounds. Each module in FISYS is supposed 
to characterize a specific component in the fishery system. Experts who are knowledgeable about 
a specific component must feel comfortable with the module representing that component. Since 
aggregation is employed, the module is clearly not as detailed as the expert's knowledge in the 
specific domain. Thus validity is determined by the s t ruc ture  of module rather than detailed 
disaggregation. The second test is whether the integration is successfully performed. This involves 
one's belief in the microeconomic theory of a market solution and in the algorithm that provides 
the market solution. Then we have the "mental test": FISYS must be helpful in developing an 
intuitive "feel" for how the fishery being modeled operates, how it responds to environmental 
fluctuations, and most importantly, how it would respond to policy changes. We also have a "data 
test" which includes the simulation of the fishery system under the prevailing conditions with 
nominal estimated parameters. The outcome variables as obtained in FISYS endogenously are 
matched with the actual outcome variables as provided by the prevailing data.t 
The passing of the above tests provides some confidence on the validity of FISYS. However, 
the ultimate test is provided by applying FISYS to actual plan evaluation, both ex  ante  and 
ex  post .  These test on FISYS were carried out for several fisheries, the case of Texas shrimp 
fishery is discussed in the companion paper [13]. Once FISYS has been proven to be an effective 
tool which enables one to integrate information from many sources and disciplines to provide an 
overall picture of the situation under different policy choices, it can play the role as described in 
Section 2. 
The procedure by which FISYS can be used is illustrated in Fig. 3. Understanding of the 
beneficiary groups' concern about a particular fishery problem helps to identify the basic issue of 
tin contrast to statistical or econometric methods, data on outcome variables are used for model validation i stead of model 
estimation. Scientific data are used for parameter stimation. 
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Preferences of 
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Scientific information and 
professional experience 
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estimation 
== Nominal parameter 
Model estimated va ue 
I Run FISYS [ Present policy 
(base case) --~ 
Compare model output with "best*' J 
scientific information, consult I with scientific and professionals 
Structural and parameters l- 
sensitivity studies l-Range of parameter 
values 
Compare results with best I Policy choices 
scientific information, consult Ii 
with scientists and professionals I- f 
Sensitivity of structure and J 
parameters to policy choices I 
Recommend Recommend 
scientific studies statistical studies and 
groups and decision makers relevant to policy data needs relevant to 
choice policy choice 
Fig. 3. The use of  FISYS in a responsive decision process. 
the problem at hand. Scientific information and professional experience are used to determine the 
physical structure of the problem under consideration. From these understandings, one may 
determine an appropriate structure of FISYS which is suitable to the specific fishery problem. The 
structure of FISYS will then help focus attention on data requirements for policy analysis. 
Most of the data required by FISYS are disaggregated input data such as number of vessels in 
different categories, vessel operating cost, etc. Certain aggregate parameters are also required, e.g. 
demand elasticity, catchability coefficients of different vessels, recruitment rate, mortality rate and 
so on. Much of the required data are found in fisheries statistics, while the rest may be collected 
from other sources. Many of the required parameters are estimated by scientists in the course of 
their scientific studies. In some cases, it is possible that the required parameters have not been 
studied and estimated; in this case, consultation with experts is necessary to obtain a range of 
possible values for these parameters. 
With a set of nominal values for the parameters, FISYS is used to convert data into outcomes 
under present policy (or in some cases, no policy). This establishes a base case. By varying the 
possible range of values that the parameters can take on, and/or the structure of the inter- 
connections, FISYS generates the set of possible outcomes under parameter variations and different 
scenarios. This can be used to determine the sensitivity of structure and/or parameters to policy 
choice. Comparing the data (e.g. price and quantity of fish, effort pattern of fishermen) obtained 
from the base case study using FISYS with possible variations observed in reality and consulting 
with scientists and professionals will help determine whether the model is a good approximation 
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of the real situation. If the base case or the sensitivity studies give us results which seem to 
contradict the scientific findings or intuition based on experiences, then we must either go back 
to improve the model, or try to understand why such contradictions may arise: is it because the 
assumption made in the scientific inquiry is not the same as that made in the model? Is intuition 
based on experience incorrect bacause we neglected to consider some factor which we thought 
unimportant? By helping to address these questions, the model helps us to organize our thinking 
in a systematic way which promotes further understanding. The inner loop iterations of Fig. 3 go 
on until we feel that we have a reasonably good and comprehensive model structure. 
Finally, we conduct studies on the sensitivity of structure or parameters to policy choices. The 
output of this study would indicate to the stakeholders and the decision makers that if a certain 
policy is chosen, what will be the range of possible outcomes they can expect o see under possible 
parameter variations and different scenarios, and therefore, what is the possible risk that one is 
taking. This can help the SH and the DM to concentrate heir discussion and negotiation on relative 
risk and benefit rade-offs. The decision process is then guided by the "benefit of the nation" 
concept and eventually will lead to an equilibrium decision--a decision where all can agree. 
The studies on the sensitivity of structure to policy choices will indicate certain areas of scientific 
inquiry which have potentially high payoff in specific management decisions. Similarly, parameter 
sensitivity studies can recommend further statistical studies and data needs relevant o policy 
choice. These studies and technical information gathering will improve FISYS in its capability in 
providing useful information i  future decision processes. Thus, FISYS will evolve as knowledge 
accumulates. At every iteration, an improved FISYS will yield a "better" equilibrium decision. As 
time advances, an efficient equilibrium decision can be arrived at. In other words, FISYS can be 
used to coordinate technical support for responsive decision processes. 
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
FISYS has been extended to address the harvesting capacity issues in the Mexico Shrimp Fishery 
[24]. The generic major issue is vessel mobility. Consider there are two fishing grounds (A and B) 
with local harvesting vessels. Suppose the local vessels in ground A are large enough that they can 
have access to ground B when harvesting in ground A is either prohibited by local fishery policy 
or the resource is depleted to the point that marginal profit is negative; whereas local vessels in 
ground B are small and can only fish in their local ground. In such a situation, local fishery 
policy in ground A will impact on the economic well-being of fishermen as well as resource 
depletion in ground B. This complicates the management process with an increase in the number 
of stakeholders with conflicting interests. This issue arises in the Texas-Louisiana shrimp fisheries. 
The use of FISYS in this study was to bring the issue out for discussions rather than "finding" 
the optimum policy. 
Further development was made in implementing FISYS on a personal computer that can greatly 
enhance the "dialogue" between the model and the users [25]. 
In all the studies we have performed, we found that the real value of FISYS is that it provides 
a deeper understanding of the complex issues involved in any management si uation that may be 
faced by fishery resource managers. The insights that we gain through interactive use of FISYS 
and the possible xplanation one can offer for different model outputs under different scenarios 
are tremendous. A case study using FISYS is described in the companion paper [13]. 
The final remark is that FISYS was developed to handle generic fishery resource management. 
To apply it to a specific specie, we need to specify the fish population dynamic for that specie; and 
to apply it to specific industry structure, we need to specify the harvesting and processing modules  
accordingly. Even though FISYS was developed for fishery resources, its modular structure allows 
it to be modified for other resource management applications. 
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